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, H 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
KELLY GRAFF and KERI 
GRAFF, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 18062 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs-Appellants 
against Defendant-Respondent seeking to invalidate a 
mechanics lien filed against Plaintiffs' property. 
· DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The controversy was submitted to the court on dual 
motions for summary judgment. The court granted Defendant's 
motion and denied Plaintiffs' motion and accordingly ruled 
that the mechanics lien was valid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
ruling and an order invalidating the mechanics lien. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are undisputed. On November 9, 
1979 defendant Boise Cascade filed a Materialmen's Notice and 
Claim of Lien in the Utah County Recorder's office. The 
Notice and Claim of Lien was executed and signed by Berk 
Buttars. The Notice was contained in a printed form prepared 
by Boise cascade Corporation. (R. 8). The lien concerned 
property located in Utah County with the record title holder 
being listed as Roncor, Inc. 
At the time the lien was filed Plaintiffs owned the 
equitable title to such property by way of an unrecorded 
agreement between Roncor and Plaintiffs dated May 14, 1979. 
Subsequently, in April of 1980 Plaintiffs filed notice of 
their interest in the property with the Utah County Recorder. 
On December 11, 1979 Boise Cascade filed a suit against 
Roncor, Inc. requesting foreclosure of the various mechanics 
liens against Utah County properties, including that of 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were not named as party-defendants 
either at the commencement of suit or subsequently ±n that 
action. That lawsuit was filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County and was assigned to Judge Bullock as 
Civil No. 53223. 
On March 17, 1980 this action was originally filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court. Subsequently, Defendants 
moved to dismiss the action based upon "priority of jurisdic-
-2-
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tion" claiming the Utah County suit precluded the Salt Lake 
County action. (R. 5-13) . After a hearing before the Third 
Judicial District Court Defendant's motion was denied. (R. 18). 
On June 19, 1980 Defendants moved to change venue to 
Utah County. (R. 20). This motion was granted and the case 
was transferred to Utah County as Civil No. 55438. 
The parties filed dual motions for summary judgment 
based upon the undisputed facts and upon various affidavits. 
(R. 134-136; 90-92; 171-173). On August 26, 1981 Judge David 
Sam ruled that Defendant was in substantial compliance with 
the mechanics lien law and therefore granted Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and denied the motion of Plaintiffs. 
(R. 187-188). It is from this order that the present appeal 
is taken. (R. 193). 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THE 
MECH.Ai~ICS LIEN OF DEFENDANT INVALID SINCE IT 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW. 
The sole question before this Court is the validity of 
the mechanics lien notice filed by Defendant on November 9, 
1979. If the notice complied with Section 38-1-7, U.C.A., 
the ruling of the lower court would be correct--however, if 
it failed to comply with this statute the court was in error. 
Plaintiffs contended in the lower court that the notice 
was defective because it was not properly verified and did 
not contain the name of the person to whom the materials were 
-3-
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furnished. The notice was printed on a form prepared by 
defendant Boise Cascade Corporation. For the convenience 
of the court a copy is contained as an appendix to this Brief. 
The parts of the notice which Plaintiffs claim are defective 
concern the verification block and the first three lines 
of the notice. 
The signature block contained the words BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION By /s/ Berk Buttars, Agent. 
The verification block appeared as follows: 
State of-"4.{'"""'~.-...:t;&z.:;.,:;..;.;..i_.·_.·. ·_county of----...:./L.._.:;.i.'fA.o::;....;_£..:;.,£.  .-..·_ .. · ... : 
-~----'----
·.; .:·. ·.\' 
. ; .. 
Being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: that be j; :· ._ .. 
an ngel'_'lt of BOIS~ CASCADE CORPORATION, a corporation, · .. 
the cliumnnt herein and makes this verification for and on its 
behalf; that he has read the foregoing notice and claim of lien 
and ~nows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true 
and Just. · ~ 
The mechanics lien statute has been part of Utah law 
since its admittance to statehood. This Court has consistently 
held that a mechanics lien is statutory and not contractual 
-4-
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and that a lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant 
complies strictly with the statutory provisions. Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 87 P. 713 (Utah 1906); First Security 
.Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, No. 17229, June 10, 1981 (Utah). 
Section 38-1-7 U.C.A. (the lien notice statute) has 
been amended on several occasions by the Legislature but 
basically has maintained the same requirements for a valid 
lien as originally required in 1898. The statute requires 
that the notice of lien state, among other things, "the name 
of the owner, if known, and also the name of the person by 
whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the materials" 
and that, the claim must "be verified by the oath of himself 
or of some other person." 
Courts in Utah and throughout the country have required 
a lien claimant to strictly comply with notice requirements 
provided by the various lien laws because of the serious 
consequence such a lien can place upon the owner's property. 
Justice Howe in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra, 
stated this policy as follows: 
The policy underlying these decisions is sound. 
A lien creates an encumbrance on property that 
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear 
title and impairs his credit. The filing of a 
lien for an excessive amount could be used to 
force a settlement unfairly weighted in favor of 
the claimant. Such abuse is made a misdemeanor 
by Section 38-1-25. These serious consequences 
justify the statutory imposition of a requirement 
that one who makes the claim must furnish a sworn 
-5-
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statement to the truthfulness of the facts giving 
rise to it. Frivilous, unfounded, and inflated 
claims can thereby be minimized, and the pre-
judgment property rights of the individuals 
receive their due protection. (Slip Opinion, p. 4) . 
The Montana Supreme Court has also elaborated on the 
requirement of verification and the test to be applied. The 
court there stated: 
This extraordinary claim should not be placed 
on the property of another unless the facts out of 
which the lien arises are vouched for on oath by 
some person who knows them to exist. . . . The 
sanction of perjury insures the veracity of the 
statements made by the person with knowledge. Thus, 
a test of the sufficiency of the affidavit to a 
mechanics lien is whether perjury is assignable 
upon the verification to it. Saunders Cash-Way 
v. Herrick, 587 P.2d 947 (Mont. 1978). (Emphasis 
added) . 
See also, H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, 
563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977); Hoffman v. Palm Springs, 337 
P.2d 132 (Cal. App. 1959}. 
In the instant case, Mr. Buttars signed on behalf of 
the corporation in the signature block. No agent, however, 
was listed as "being first duly sworn" nor did any agent 
execute the line irrunediately below the oath of verification. 
The oath of verification as printed on the form stated that 
the person verifying the lien was an agent of Boise Cascade 
Corporation, that verification was made on behalf of the 
corporation, and that the person had read the foregoing notice 
and claim and knew the contents and believed they were true 
and just. The "jurat" of the notary public, following the 
-6-
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blank line, merely states: "Subscribed and sworn" and then 
contains the name of the notary, date, and commission infor-
mation. 
Plaintiffs contended in the lower court that the failure 
of any person to actually sign the written oath and statement 
contained on the Notice and Claim of Lien caused the lien to 
fail since it was not "verified". The lower court held the 
signature of Buttars in the signature block substantially 
complied with the verification requirement. (R. 187-188). 
The court assumed that because Buttars had signed on behalf 
of the corporation in the signature block of the lien that 
he was the person who would have been "first duly sworn" and 
that he was the person whom the notary described as 
"subscribed and sworn". 
The decision of the lower court was erroneous. As the 
notice was written there was no person described as "being 
first duly sworn" nor was any signature executed following 
the oath. The verification block must be viewed separately 
from the signature block since it is possible that one person 
signs on behalf of the corporation but does not know the 
contents to be true while another person is aware of the 
true contents but is not authorized by the corporation to 
file liens. 
Here, the verification block states that 
"being first duly sworn under oath deposes and 
-7-
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says .•.. " It is unsigned. The jurat of the notary 
states "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of 
November, 1979" followed by the notary's signature. 
Thus, had this been a normal affidavit it would have 
been defective on its face since the reader would not know 
whose affidavit was being "subscribed and sworn" to nor 
would there be any signature binding the affiant. The fact 
that Buttars signed a separate portion of the lien notice is 
inunaterial to the sufficiency of the verification block. 
The initial Utah lien law was enacted in 1898. At that 
time it required the same elements including verification. 
Section 2983 of the 1898 code provided the definition of 
verification as used at that time. It stated: "The affidavit 
of verification must state that the pleading is true to the 
knowledge of the deponent. " The statute continued, 
"When the pleading is verified by the attorney or other person, 
except one of the parties, the verification must show the 
reason why it is not made by a party. " 
The oath and statement contained on the lien form pro-
vided by Boise Cascade would have met the requirements of 
Utah law had it been executed. First, it would have confirmed 
that the signer was an agent of Boise Cascade Corporation 
and made the verification on its behalf. The Supreme Court of 
Kansas in Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. Ash Grove Lime and Port-
land Cement Co., 400 P.2d 707 (Kan. 1956) invalidated a lien 
-8-
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in which the oath taken by the agent of the corporation failed 
to state that he was acting on behalf of the corporation. 
Unless the person signing the lien claim swears that he is 
authorized to act on behalf of the corporation a valid lien 
verification has not been made. 
Likewise, the printed oath stated that the signer "had 
read the foregoing notice and knew the contents thereof and 
believed the same to be true and just." It is essential 
that the claimant state under oath that the charges listed in 
the lien were actually incurred and are correct. Merely 
stating that the form itself appears to be a correct listing 
of the charges or that the charges appear to be correct 
based upon information and belief is not sufficient. 
Saunders Cash-Way v. Herrick, 587 P.2d 947 (Mont. 1978). 
This Court has stated that an acknowledgement of mere 
corporate authority is insufficient without also a sworn 
statement that the charges are correct and true. First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra. See also~ H.A.M.S. Co. v. 
Electrical Contractors of Alaska, 568 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977). 
The instant "Materialmen's Notice and Claim of Lien" 
failed these requirements since the critical information 
contained in the printed form was not executed. There could 
be no charge of perjury made against any person if the lien 
notice was proven fraudulent. The lien clearly fails to meet 
the "verification" requirement of the statute since verifi-
-9-
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cation includes both the actual swearing to the truth of 
the statements by the subscriber and also the certification 
thereto by the notary or other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 71 C.J.S., Pleading, §343, p. 743. See 
also, In Re James Passero & Sons, 261 N.Y.S. 661 (N.Y. Supp. 
Ct. 19 33) . 
The jurat is not a part of the affidavit but is simply 
a certificate of a notary that the person who executed the 
signature was in fact the true person whose name appeared. 
It is no part of the oath but is merely evidence of the fact 
that the person appeared before the notary. Stern v. Board of 
Elections of Cuyahoga County, 23_7 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio 1968). 
As such, the broad "subscribed and sworn" language used in 
this document cannot of itself give rise to the requirement of 
verification since the notary was not attempting to verify the 
truth of the charges contained in the lien. The jurat is 
merely ancillary to the actual oath and signature of the 
aff iant to verify the accuracy of the signature and to confirm 
that an oath was taken. As stated by the Supreme Court of Maine: 
If a certificate of oath were not a necessary 
prerequisite to the recording of the lien claim 
notice and essential to its validity and the fact 
that the oath had been administered could be shown 
at trial, such a practice would open the door to 
abuses, mischiefs, errors, and potential fraud 
difficult to detect. The temptation would be there 
for witnesses, including justices of the peace, 
notary publics, and attorneys involved in the 
alleged administration of the oath, to activate 
-10-
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doubtful memories to fit their interests. 
Pineland Lumber Co. v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 33 
(Me. 197 8) . 
In addition, not only did the materialmen's notice 
fail to state specifically the verification required by law 
but the subsequent affidavit of Mr. Buttars filed on July 10, 
1981 attempting to "verify that he has read said materalmen's 
notice and claim of lien and knows the contents thereof and 
believes the sarne to be true and just" is also deficient 
since that affidavit was not notarized. (R. 90-91). Thus, 
on both documents no charge of perjury could ever be levied 
against any person since the lien was unsigned. 
The affidavit of Buttars, even if it had been notarized, 
would not have cured the defect. Extrinsic evidence as to 
the validity of a mechanics lien is not sufficient. As 
noted by the Kansas Supreme Court: 
Plaintiff offered to show and did testify 
that when the acknowledgement was made he was 
sworn to the statement, but the statement filed 
to constitute a lien must be complete in itself 
and must show on its face all the matters which 
the statute requires to be shown to create and 
fix the lien. . . . [R]eferences and evidence 
outside the lien statement are not sufficient 
to support a lien. Reeves v. Kansas Coop. Wheat 
Marketing Assn., 15 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1940). 
In the instant case there is no sworn statement by any person 
that he knew the charges of the lien and knew them to be 
true and just. 
As this Court is aware the form of verification is 
-11-
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critical to successfully claiming a valid mechanics lien. 
Numerous cases, as mentioned earlier, have struck down liens 
because they have not strictly complied with the statutory 
requirement of verification. A mechanics lien, unlike a 
normal affidavit, has a devastating effect in and of itself 
whereas most affidavits have no effect except to assist in 
an underlying purpose such as a lawsuit. 
Besides the verification defect the notice states that 
Boise Cascade upon the request of Boise Cascade furnished 
materials comprising the subject of the lien. The statute 
requires that the person who requests the work be listed in 
the lien. This requirement is no doubt present to eliminate 
any problems involved when persons other than the owner request 
work to be performed. As the form now stands it is unknown 
whether the owner Roncor requested the material or whether 
some other contractor, subcontractor, or person actually 
entered into the agreement. Failing to include proper names 
in notices of claims have also invalidated the lien. H & L 
Supply, Inc. v. Ewing, 61 Cal. Rptr. 289 (Cal. App. 1968); 
Lewis v. Midway Lumber, 568 P.2d 750 (Ct. Ariz. 1977). 
This error combined with the failure to properly verify 
clearly invalidates the mechanics lien notice and the decision 
of the lower court is therefore erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of Defendant to properly verify the lien is 
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iS 
fatal to enforcement of the lien. This requirement is not a 
mere technicality with no purpose. This deficiency is analogous 
to a witness at trial testifying without having sworn to the 
truth of his testimony. It is analogous to an affidavit in which 
no notarization appears. All these procedures are designed 
to impose sanctions against falsehoods and to imput the signi-
ficance of the statement to the affiant. 
Defendant's failure to even list who was "sworn" together 
with the failure of an executed signature cannot be overcome 
by arguing "substantial compliance" because the verification 
in this case was not a deficiency of degree but was lacking in 
total. Likewise, the error of listing Boise Cascade as ordering 
the materials from itself cannot be overcome by "substantial 
compliance" since this information was statutorily required and 
was simply wrong--no room for equitable adjustment exists. 
The decision of the lower court should be reversed and 
judgment entered on behalf of Plaintiffs. 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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~. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
MAT' .• '.L~!.t\.:\'S NOTICE AL'tD CLA'.~. 
r. N9TJ'.GFJ JS HEREBY GIVEN, that BOISE CASCADE CORPGRATJ.0.N, Claimant herein, at 
· th~ '"'rc~uest of Boise Cascade: Corrorntion 
EA?,l."U. Ti\i !~'.~:'. 
did on the 2nd day of Augu , 19...1.L, begin to sell, furnish and deliver material~ to 
..:t.:..:h.;;;.em=-_ _.,_· '-·~rid at their request did continue to sell, furnish and deliver building materials to_ 
them until the 4th dar of Seotember , 19..1..L, which was the last day on which. 
:mi<l materials were so sold, furnished and delivered, to he used for-----------------
Cons trucc ion of a new house 




Harbor Park Subdivision, Plat A, Lot #29. 
The building materials so sold, furnished and delivered were used in the construction and/or alteration<;. 
and repair of the huilding(s) and improvements above mentioned. 
The narne(s) of the owner(s) and reputed owner(s) of the lands, building(s) and improvements to be 
charged with the lien is/ are __ ..;R:.;.;o~n:.;.;c~o:;..;r:-..;I::..:n.:..:c:..:o::.:r:.::D::.::O::.:r:.::a::..::t:.::e:.:::d~-~H~e=-=r--=i..,.t...s:a~Q:;.loie,__.P...r.r..i.oi.pp!!;;,,.w.r...r.t~y;....i..C""au.m~p.1.1;;au.n~y.__ _____ _ 
______________________________________ ..;._ _____ ,,..;.., 
The building materials so sold, furnished and delivered amounted in value to the sum of _______ ·---- --:.:-
One thousand one hundred fiftv one dollars 64/100--------------- D~llars ($ J J 51 6'• ),,:~:? 
and no part of this amount has been paid and there are no just credits or offsets e:<cep..__ ________ ._.-_ ·-1' 
__ N_~o_n_e ___________________________ --.J.Jollara ($---·""'O""-=-->· 
There is a balance due and unpaid for such materials to this claimant over and above all just credits ancl:.,_:-l 
offsets of One thousand one hundred fifty one dollars 64/100-------flollars ($ 11 51 64 )";·: -~ 
for which last named sum BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION claims a lien upon the sai · <; 
__ n_e_w_l...:y:-c_o_n_s_t_r_u_c_t_e..;d;..  .;;h;..;;o..;u;..;;s;..;e~------------------aand the lands above describ~d . . · :( 
Dated at. __ _.:.O,._re:::.:m:.:.·~U::.:t::.:.a...:.h,.__ _ , the 8th 
For Recorder's Use 
Mnil to: 
31·343 
day of_-~N~o"-ly~eo:.!m.!.l;b~e:.i,r __________ _, 1~1.L 
~ CASCADE CORPORATION. 
By ~15t.,.0 &zt;:/~~ 
~·~~ 
I /-i'-~7 ~ 1-'- / State of JV06.... County of f/d/1/t_ 
. l 
. , .. 
Being first dul;• sworn upon oath deposes and snys: thnt h~ is 
an 11.gent of BOISE CASCADE COP. :'CIRA TION, n corno~tfon., 
the cl:limnnt herein nnd m:1i:<:?a t:!!s ,·-:~:!!,·~tbn. fo:- l!nd on i~~ 
beh::i'i; th:it he has tc:iJ the fo::-c:7:·:~·7 notice ~n.d dnil':l of lh':i 
and \mows the contc>nts thereof 1w,i k· :i~n:i tr.C? sr.rni:? to Ile t:"'.!(' 
nntl jul!t. 
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